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IN PRACTICE
This article has been written in response to a publication by 
Donrich Jordaan titled ‘Social justice and research using human 
biological material: A response to Mahomed, Nöthling-Slabbert 
and Pepper’[1] in the July 2016 SAMJ (hereinafter referred to as 
Jordaan’s critique). The original article to which Jordaan’s critique 
refers and that provides the source for his response appeared in 
the South African Journal of Bioethics and Law in 2013, titled 
‘The legal position on the classification of human tissue in South 
Africa: Can tissues be owned?’[2] (hereinafter referred to as the 
original article).
Jordaan’s critique[1] mainly attempts to highlight weaknesses in the 
original article’s purported challenge to current healthcare public 
policy; contend that the original article’s conclusion regarding the 
legal ambivalence characterising ownership of human biological 
materials is incorrect; indicate that the original article’s alleged shift 
away from altruism lends no support to such shift; and purport 
that profit-sharing is not the only alternative to altruism. It is our 
contention that Jordaan’s critique is based on a misinterpretation 
of the issues raised relating to the ownership of human tissue, an 
issue extensively debated in the academic sphere for many years. 
Jordaan’s critique focuses on selected aspects of the original article 
and draws unjustifiable inferences from these. The purpose of this 
article is to contextualise Jordaan’s critique and reaffirm the validity 
of the arguments made in the original article in 2013. There are, 
however, certain aspects of Jordaan’s critique that we as authors 
of the original article acknowledge and appreciate in the spirit of 
academic discourse.
The original article’s alleged challenge 
to current healthcare public policy
It was never the intention of the original article to challenge 
current healthcare policy, as Jordaan suggests. The intention was 
to provide an outline of the legislative framework regarding the 
ownership of human tissue in South Africa (SA) and to comment 
broadly on whether it provides sufficient and consistent guidance 
in this regard. The purpose was to highlight further, by analysing 
relevant international case law (as the position remains untested 
in SA courts), differing views on ownership of human tissue, with 
specific emphasis on medical research. In addition, the original 
article argues that the use of the word ‘ownership’ as referred to in 
the Regulations to the National Health Act 61 of 2003 (hereinafter 
referred to as the NHA) is problematic and that it should be 
substituted with a ‘proprietary interest’, which denotes something 
different from the legal understanding of ownership.[2] It is trite 
that conclusion validity inter alia requires scientific conclusions 
to be reasonable, which, with regard to Jordaan’s observations, 
appears to fall short of this requirement, as his critique selectively 
analyses certain issues in the original article, without regard to 
the entire context thereof. This, in our view as authors of the 
original article, has created confusion and misperception which 
this article aims to address. The legal principles highlighted in 
this article relate to the ownership of removed human tissue or 
human biological materials for medical research, therapeutics 
or diagnostic purposes. Human tissue and human biological 
materials are used interchangeably.
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One should not overlook the fact that advances in medicine, ranging 
from transplant surgery to in vitro fertilisation, nanotechnology 
and neuroscience, have radically changed the way in which human 
bodies are perceived. There are abundant examples in law showing 
the law’s uneasiness in making sense of the human body in the 
context of ownership and property, as the notion of owning oneself 
(and one’s tissues) implies that persons are able to objectify their 
selves, and in the process become susceptible to objectification by 
others.[2] Furthermore, the question of the human body as property 
involves complicated ethical and philosophical dimensions that 
cannot be dealt with exhaustively within the scope of a legislative 
framework. There are very real issues with regard to who owns 
human tissue, especially in the research context.
Terminology
Jordaan criticises the original article’s reference to the terms ‘human 
tissue’ and ‘tissue donors’ and suggests that ‘human biological 
material’ and ‘research participant’ are more appropriate terms for 
the SA context. The original article draws attention to the fact that, 
owing to inconsistencies and contradictions between the definitions 
relating to human tissue,[3] human biological material,[4] tissue,[5] 
substance[6] and body specimen[7] in the NHA and the different 
sets of Regulations thereto, ambiguity should be avoided as these 
terms essentially relate to one another. The original article also 
argues that the NHA and its Regulations do not provide for a legal 
classification of human tissue, and to this end cause imprecision 
and uncertainty. Jordaan’s critique, in fact, incorrectly references 
definitions from the first edition of the National Department of 
Health’s ethics guidelines,[8] these having subsequently been updated 
by the publication of a second edition[9] in 2015.
Is ownership of human tissue certain?
The original article contends that there are currently no firm rules 
per se in respect of ownership of human biological materials, as far 
as medical research is concerned. This is particularly relevant when 
secondary uses of materials and third-party transfers relevant to 
biobank research are considered. Jordaan’s differing opinion and 
argument in support of such opinion hinges on the original article’s 
perceived misunderstanding of the common law position in SA, 
misguidance in respect of the interpretation of legislation, and 
relevance of foreign case law alluded to.
The original article’s interpretation of the common law 
understanding of the human body is in fact similar to the position 
expressed in Jordaan’s critique. The human body and its parts are 
traditionally classified as res extra commercium (things outside the 
commercial sphere). Separated bodily materials present a problematic 
category, as the law has traditionally regarded separated bodily 
materials as res nullius, belonging to no one, until brought under the 
control of the first person who obtains possession of the separated 
human tissue.[2,10] The universal legal prohibition on the sale or 
trade of human tissue, embodied globally, and various statutory 
regulations on the use of human tissue, are equally ambiguous, as 
these statutory prohibitions paradoxically reinforce a construction 
of the human body as a commodity (property), subject to regulation. 
It is unfortunate that Jordaan, in taking exception to the original 
article’s reference to the NHA Regulations Relating to Artificial 
Fertilisation,[11] selects one paragraph specific to the ownership of 
gametes, without considering the original article’s position that 
underlines the ambiguity created in respect of the operational 
definitions of an embryo in the NHA and the 2012 Regulations.[6] The 
original article emphasises that current legislation does not provide 
any guidance on whether an embryo may fulfil the requirements to 
be categorised as property. In contradiction to Jordaan’s assumption 
that the original article relies on one specific set of Regulations[11] 
to further a general position regarding uncertainty of ownership of 
human biological material, its intent in this instance was to highlight 
that the exact characterisation of an embryo in SA law remains 
unknown and will have to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis, 
taking into consideration all relevant factors.[2]
Jordaan’s critique questions the relevance in the original article of 
Washington University v Catalona.[12] This specific case was selected 
to highlight how courts have struggled to reconcile legal tradition 
and precedent with novel ethical and legal challenges arising from 
the use of human tissue in the biotechnology era. This case illustrates 
that even though samples were donated to the university for the 
purpose of cancer research, the institution could not use the samples 
as they pleased without any regard to the rights of the participants. It 
is not uncommon for international case law to be cited in instances 
where domestic law is untested, silent or ambiguous with regard to 
a specific legal issue. Even though, as Jordaan points out, human 
biological materials are a proper object of ownership in Missouri, the 
participants in this case still retained rights as to how their tissues 
would be used and were provided with the opportunity to disallow 
the use of their tissues for future research purposes, despite the fact 
that the institution was regarded as the owner of the tissues.[13]
We agree, in part, with Jordaan’s interpretation of the California 
Supreme Court judgment in Moore v Regents of the University of 
California.[14] However, the California Supreme Court in Moore 
cautioned that ‘we do not purport to hold that excised cells can 
never be property for any purpose whatsoever …’.[14] The settlement 
between the members of the Havasupai tribe and Arizona State 
University[15] suggests that the defendants and their counsel in 
this matter applied the qualifying language as set out in Moore 
seriously.[16] The Havasupai tribe alleged that researchers from 
Ari zona State University had collected blood samples to study the 
prevalence of diabetes in their tribe; however, subsequently and 
without their permission, the researchers used the blood samples to 
study genetic markers for other disorders, including schizophrenia 
and alcoholism.[16] In order to remedy the problematic situation, 
Arizona State University agreed to compensate members of the tribe 
monetarily, return the blood samples and provide other forms of 
assistance to the disadvantaged Havasupai. The significance of this 
settlement highlights that the rights of participants can indeed be 
violated when they are not fully informed about how their samples, 
in this case blood samples, might be used. By questioning the honesty 
of researchers from Arizona State University and probing whether 
they had been involved in exploiting a vulnerable population, this 
case cast a negative image on the university, which portrayed itself 
as a respectable institution for American Indian studies.[15] Genetics 
experts and civil rights advocates assert that the continuous and 
growing debate over a researcher’s responsibility to communicate the 
range of personal information that may be sourced from DNA at the 
time it is initially collected may be further fuelled by the outcomes 
of this case.[15]
We may only speculate on the outcome of this matter, had it 
been litigated in court. The university’s decision to settle, however, 
possibly indicates apprehension on the part of the university that 
litigation would have been successful. In a 2014 Canadian judgment, 
the Ontario Superior Court of Justice decided, as a preliminary 
issue, that tissue removed from a body for diagnostic medical tests 
is ‘personal property’ belonging to the hospital where the procedure 
was performed.[17] This case involved an action of medical negligence 
instituted by the estate of a deceased patient against two doctors for 
failing to diagnose colorectal cancer of the deceased, who died in 
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2011. The doctors requested to have access to the liver tissue biopsied 
from the deceased. Before considering whether the defendant doctors 
had a right to access the liver tissue to determine whether the 
deceased patient had hereditary non-polyposis colorectal cancer, the 
court had to address the issue of ownership of the relevant tissue.
An earlier UK judgment that has made reference to ownership 
of male gametes is Yearworth v North Bristol NHS Trust,[18] which 
involved the negligent destruction of the sperm of six men that 
had been stored prior to their cancer treatment. In this case, the 
Court of Appeal for England and Wales held that, for the purposes 
of the negligence claim, the men ‘owned’ their sperm as the sperm 
was deposited solely for their own benefit. ‘Ownership’ of human 
tissue or human biological materials, although possible in certain 
circumstances, is therefore not as clear cut as Jordaan proposes. 
What these cases may point to is that although the position that all 
human biological material is not property remains the status quo, 
some courts seem willing to deal with novel cases on an ad hoc basis, 
which over time may extend the circumstances under which human 
biological material could be viewed as legal property. This supports 
the contention in the original article that there may be some instances 
where a case-by-case approach is more appropriate, as the specific 
facts of a matter do have significant bearing on the outcomes, as seen 
above.[2]
The original article’s alleged shift away 
from altruism towards a model of 
profit-sharing
Contrary to Jordaan’s critique, which suggests that the original article 
proposes that the current altruistic research paradigm be replaced by 
profit-sharing by participants, the original article introduces the 
proposition of compensation for research participants as a means 
to benefit the most vulnerable in society. In fact, the ‘altruistic 
paradigm’ to which Jordaan refers is in itself questionable, as the 
historical exploitation of research participants in Africa is a glaring 
reality.[19-21] The fact that Troug et al.[22] do not specifically advocate 
a profit-sharing model is not a point that the authors of the original 
article were trying to make. Truog et al.[22] recommend, in light of 
the Moore decision[14] and other legal precedents, that individuals do 
not retain property ownership over removed tissues:[2] ‘a plausible 
rationale for justifying such payments is that they are made in 
exchange for the performance of a service, rather than for the 
transfer of property’.[22] Furthermore, if human tissues are afforded 
a proprietary interest, they would be protected from unauthorised 
use. The holders of the proprietary right (i.e. the research subject) 
would have to consent to any use of their tissue in the research 
phase and any subsequent future use thereof. This would also 
ensure that the proceeds of any therapy developed from the tissue 
would be distributed, in part, to the participants.[2] A mandatory 
agreement stipulating the terms and conditions of such distribution 
should be enforced. In this way, unscrupulous activities could be 
minimised and vulnerable individuals, in particular, could benefit 
from the use of their tissues.[2] The authors of the original article did 
not claim that this is the only form of ‘benefit sharing’, as Jordaan’s 
critique asserts.[1] The original article merely suggests that monetary 
compensation should not be overlooked.
Jordaan’s critique furthermore contends that ‘In the absence of 
an exhaustive and convincing rationale for replacing the existing 
altruistic paradigm with a paradigm of benefit sharing by research 
participants, any discussion of benefits for research participants is 
driftwood in the legal-ethical ocean.’[1] It is prudent to note that the 
original article does not advance the view that one model be replaced 
with another. The recommendation of profit-sharing in no way 
precludes other possible or viable benefit-sharing mechanisms from 
being considered.
Conclusion
It is imperative that legislation in SA relating to the regulation of 
human tissue be amended to provide a clear and consistent message 
regarding any proprietary claims in respect of human tissue.[2] In 
the present context, researchers and academics working in the field 
of human tissue frequently express their confusion regarding the 
meaning and practical implications of possession, custodianship, 
owner ship, database rights and intellectual property. [23,24] The 
con flicting descriptions in statute and regulations relating to the 
regulation of human tissues add to this confusion.[25] In light of the 
above, we stand by the arguments developed in our original article 
and assert that to apply a blanket ‘no property rights’ rule to all 
cases in which removed human tissue is involved would amount to a 
careless and reckless application. In fact, as Goold et al.[26] correctly 
observe, the debate over whether there should be a property or non-
property approach with regard to human tissue is only the tip of 
the iceberg, because the issues involved are very complex, reflecting 
profound debates on the nature of the self and the structuring of 
society; the balance of power between the citizen, the government and 
commercial interests; and human beings’ perceptions of themselves 
and their bodies.
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